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INTERNAL LABOUR MARKETS IN RHODESIA: A CASE STUDY OF 
MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBITY
G. E. CHEATER*
Introduction
In recent months a debate has been taking place among businessmen in 
Rhodesia on the subject of company responsibilities, not only to the host 
society, but also responsibility to workers.’ Discussion on this latter aspect 
reflects a recognition amongst managers of the interdependence of factors of 
production. In the current recessionary period in Rhodesia, and with the 
concomitant squeeze on profits, the contributions of and returns to factors 
of production are being reassessed. Awareness of labour’s position in company 
operations is evidenced by the recent establishment of several well-endowed 
trust funds for the development of Rhodesia’s human resources,2 and also 
by the establishment of the commission of enquiry into advanced technical 
and commercial training.3 Besides these public displays of awareness of 
manpower considerations, most large companies in Rhodesia have a manifesto 
of company policy in which a reference to responsibility towards workers 
is generally made, covering such aspects as ‘equality of opportunity’ and a ‘fair 
return for a fair day’s work’. However, what management says, what it tells 
workers, and what it does within the organisation, may not all coincide, or 
even approximate to one another.
It is my contention in this paper that, at least in the company to be 
discussed, management’s claimed responsibility towards workers is not meant 
to apply — or to apply fully — to semi- and un-skilled workers, all of whom 
are black. In an attempt to prove this contention, I examine the internal 
labour market in one major Rhodesian company. Thereafter, I consider the 
degree of control management has over its internal labour market, and the 
extent and means whereby management meets its stated responsibility towards 
workers. In the conclusion, the various points are drawn together to demon­
strate that management meets its responsibilities to workers on a differential 
basis, discriminating either against Africans or against semi- and un-skilled
•Formerly Round Table Research Fellow, Centre for Interracial Studies, University of 
Rhodesia, 1973-4. The data on which this paper is based were collected during the 
period of my fellowship; I am grateful to the Association of Round Tables in Central 
Africa for their financial support although the views expressed here are entirely my own. 
'See for example Commerce Rhodesia, Associated Chambers of Commerce of Rhodesia, 
July, 1975, where a number of top Rhodesian businessmen discuss this topic. 
zFor example, the Rio Tinto Foundation and the Whitsun Trust. See Rhodesia Herald, 
30th October, 1974 and Business Herald, 21st August, 1975 respectively.
3Rhodesia Government Commission of Inquiry into Further Education in the Technical 
and Commercial Fields (Cameron Commission: Chairman Mr. J. D. Cameron).
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workers. Since these two categories overlap almost perfectly, it is difficult 
to establish whether the focus of this discrimination is race or industrial 
class.
The data on which this paper is based were collected during 1973-4, 
in the course of research conducted by the Centre for Interracial Studies at 
the University of Rhodesia.4 In this research, case studies of eight major Rho­
desian organisations were undertaken. While the data were drawn from a 
limited base, nevertheless there was a great deal of common ground in each 
of the companies, indicating a potentially high degree of validity for the data. 
In choosing one of the companies for detailed study in this paper, only an 
indicative insight can be claimed for this discussion. Nevertheless, I contend 
that the situation in this company is representative and that this discussion 
indicates some important principles of relatively general applicability to em­
ployment in Rhodesia.
Internal Labour Markets
The concept of internal labour markets is relatively new, especially as 
applied to southern Africa.5 Probably the fullest general discussion of the 
concept is that by Doeringer and Piore who define an internal labour market 
as ‘ . . .  an administrative unit, such as a manufacturing plant, within which 
the pricing and allocation of labour is governed by a set of administrative rules 
and procedures.’6 While there is some degree of ‘contact’ and interdependence 
between internal and external labour markets, the degree of interdependence 
varies according to the state of the external labour market.7
Besides its relative autonomy, two other attributes characterise, and may 
therefore be used to identify, internal labour markets: mobility clusters, 
which are groupings of jobs within which promotion occurs (for example, all 
the jobs in a given department); and ports of entry to employment in that 
internal labour market. Ports of entry constitute the points of ‘contact’ between
4The results of this research are reported in Murphree M. W., Cheater G. E., Dorsey 
B. J. & Mothobi B.D., Education Race and Employment in Rhodesia, ARTCA Salis­
bury, 1975.
^Although new to the region, aspects of internal labour markets have been discussed and 
applied: cf. Murphree et al op cit.; Cheater G. E. Internal Labour Markets, Race and 
Efficient Manpower Utilisation, paper presented to the annual Conference of the 
Association of Sociologists of Southern Africa, Durban, July, 1974; and Spandau A. 
On-the-job Training on the Assembly Plant of a South African Motor Vehicle Pro­
ducer. Rhodesian Journal of Economics, vol. 6. no. 4 December, 1972, pp.26-45.
sDoeringer P. B. & Piore M. J. Internal Labour Markets and Manpower Analysis, 
D. C. Heath & Co., Boston, 1971, pp.2-3.
vDoeringer & Piore discuss internal labour markets in the USA, a developed and rela­
tively full-employment economy. The situation in less-developed economies, which 
generally experience labour surpluses and skill shortages in the external labour 
markets has not, to my knowledge, received much attention yet in the literature.
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internal and external labour markets; they are generally the lowest job grades 
(but may also be found at other levels) in the mobility cluster; and they are 
almost always fewer in number than the number of job grades in that mobility 
cluster. For example, in a workshop, the external recruitment of both first-year 
apprentices and qualified artisans may occur, but more senior apprentices, 
workshop foremen and managers are generally promoted from within the 
mobility cluster. These three characteristics — an administrative unit, mobility 
clusters, and ports of entry — provide static criteria to identify internal labour 
markets.
From a dynamic point of view, Doeringer and Piore identify three 
characteristics giving rise to and maintaining internal labour markets: specific 
skills, i.e. skills specific to a given work environment;8 on-job training, which 
is usually informal, unstructured and given by another employee in the course 
of production; and custom, the general acceptance by workers of an un­
written set of rules of behaviour based on past practice. These rules may at 
some stage be accepted by the bureaucracy and formalised in writing.
The rules and procedures governing internal labour markets may be used 
by different elements in that market to obtain a different pricing and alloca­
tion of labour to that which would result from ‘free market forces’.9 In this 
type of situation, the relative power or control over strategic resources in 
the internal labour market, such as knowledge or skills, which is held by 
different categories of employees, will dictate to a large extent the allocation 
and pricing of labour.10 Typically, power groupings are used to attain or 
maintain control over one or more of the three factors: job categories; skills 
(or other scarce resources); or socio-economic differentials such as status or 
income superiority. In Rhodesia, the two main issues in internal labour 
markets are generally skills and race, these issues being interrelated. In this 
respect, it may be noted that the main forms of racial discrimination in inter­
nal labour markets are found in: wages and conditions of service; recruitment 
and promotion policies; and manpower development policies.
Having introduced the concepts associated with internal labour markets, 
in the next section of this paper, the company under discussion is introduced
®This definition of specific skill is different to that of Becker who adopts a marginal 
productivity approach: cf. Doeringer & Piore op cit. p.14 and Becker G. S. Human 
Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis with special reference to Education, 
Columbia University Press, New York, 1964.
®I do not mean to imply that ‘free market forces’ could exist in internal labour markets. 
These markets, virtually by definition, cannot exhibit such a free situation because 
they are institutionally controlled in circumstances far removed from perfect competi­
tion. The point here is that the dominant grouping in these markets sets or influences 
most the allocation of and returns to manpower in the internal labour market.
<°The dynamics of such power situations are to some extent explored in D. Bates: Politics 
of Race: Comperative Studies, London D. C. Heath 1975.
1 2 0 THE RHODESIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
and identified as an internal labour market. Thereafter, the dynamics of con­
trol and influence in the internal labour market, especially concerning skills 
and the racial distribution of jobs, are examined.
The Company as an Internal Labour Market
This company, the local branch of a multinational Canadian corporation, 
has been operating on its present site in a Midlands industrial complex for 
more than thirty years. Company policy at the time of research was dictated 
in general terms from the Canadian head office in the form of manuals 
covering most routine aspects of company operations, such as accounting pro­
cedures and personnel functions. However, while management may appear 
to have been constrained in a number of ways in respect of decision-making, 
the company manual covering the personnel function stated that local manage­
ment may interpret company rules and introduce such flexibility as ‘local 
conditions’ may require. This caveat has resulted in much greater flexibility 
in decision-making for local management than might otherwise seem possible.
The company’s industrial complex comprised four separate factories and 
an administrative block, all on the same site. Each factory was independent 
only in respect of production techniques. Two of the factories produced the 
same type of commodity but, because of different materials and designs, 
different techniques were found in each factory. The remaining two factories 
were processing plants preparing raw materials for the two manufacturing 
units. All other functions in the complex were centralised, with the exception 
of sales and distribution, which were, however, still centrally controlled. All 
policy was laid down or interpreted by local management, from head office 
manuals where relevant.
Besides company manuals, the organisation also comes under industrial 
regulations (under the Industrial Conciliation Act) applying to the whole 
industry.11 Because the company dominated the industry, holding approxim­
ately 90 per cent of the market,12 when a new set of industrial regulations was
"For discussions on the Industrial Conciliation Act and the positions of trades unions in 
Rhodesia, see for example the special edition on Rhodesia (edited by Dr. D. G. Clarke) 
of the South African Labour Bulletin, vol. 1 no. 9 March, 1975; and and Murphree 
M. W. Employment Opportunity and Race in Rhodesia, University of Denver Press, 
Denver, 1972.
' a According to company management, the company actively seeks to maintain this level 
of market share, neither more nor less. One reason for this policy is that when the 
question of wages is discussed in industrial ‘negotiations’, wages are likely to be set at 
a level that the smallest company in the industry can afford. This means that the 
company under discussion, although not bound to observe the set minimum wage rates, 
can claim it does not want to ‘rock the industry boat’ by paying in excess of what its 
small competitors can afford to pay. In other words, from a wage-setting point of view, 
holding such a dominant share of the market enables the company to ‘go along with’ 
the setting of low minimum wage rates ‘in the interests of the industry’. On the other 
hand, management argued that a larger market share would lay the company open to 
monopoly accusations, which it obviously wants to avoid.
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drawn up, management in this company tended to dominate proceedings and 
was therefore extremely influential in determining the content and nature of 
these regulations. Covered in such regulations, by job grade, were: industrial 
holidays, annual and sick leave, retirement gratuities (there was no pension 
scheme), and other aspects typically covered under the Industrial Conciliation 
Act in agreements or regulations.
In summary, therefore, it may be noted that there were legal as well as 
company rules governing the allocation and development Of manpower and 
wages and conditions of service. The first criterion for the identification of 
an internal labour market was thus fulfilled by this company.
Turning to the remaining criteria — mobility clusters and ports of entry 
— these may be considered in terms of four main employment categories: 
managerial and professional; skilled and technical; clerical and supervisory; 
and semi- and un-skilled.13
For semi-and un-skilled employees, all of whom were black as only 
Africans were recruited to jobs in this category, there was only one port of 
entry, at the lowest job grade. All other job grades (a total of nine in this 
category) were filled by promotion, up to and including most of the supervisory 
positions. Hence, the semi- and un-skilled employment category comprised 
mobility clusters, extending from the lowest unskilled job grade to that of 
supervisor, usually with only one port of entry. However, each of the four 
factories and the administration was an individual mobility cluster in this 
employment category. Furthermore, although some horizontal transfers 
occurred between these mobility clusters, especially between one or other of 
the factories and the administration, these transfers generally occurred only 
at the lowest three grades of employment, usually for leave or sick leave re­
placement. As a result, these individual mobility clusters tended to be rela­
tively closed, especially at the higher job grades.
In the clerical and supervisory category, which contained both black and 
white workers although not in the same jobs, external recruitment of staff 
generally occurred, except for some supervisory positions filled by promotion. 
The criteria for selection were generally higher than those applied to the 
previous category of employment. The only port of entry was, again, at the 
lowest job grade in this category, but the mobility cluster contained only be­
tween two and four job grades, compared with nine in the previous category. 
There was, again, little inter-cluster cluster transfer of employees in this 
category.
«»For a fuller discussion of this classification, cf. Murphree et al op cit. pp.213-4.
122 THE RHODESIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
In the skilled and technical employment category, the company recruited 
first-year apprentices and qualified artisans, and trainee and qualified techni­
cians, all of whom had to be European.'4 Promotion was used to fill all other 
jobs in these mobility clusters, which meant that there were only two ports 
of entry levels. Furthermore, since these were relatively closed employment 
situations, transfer between these and other types of jobs in other mobility 
clusters were generally impossible because of skill specificity.
Finally, professional and managerial staff, with one exception,'3 were 
white, generally well-qualified, and tended to be recruited from the 
external — sometimes international — labour market. Because these 
employees were in the more senior job grades, their lines of promotion tended 
to be short and so there was a relatively low ratio between the number of 
ports of entry and the number of job grades in a mobility cluster. Especially 
in production departments, professional status could be obtained through 
in-company, sponsored courses leading to internationally recognised diplomas. 
The culmination of all lines of promotion in this employment category was 
the most senior local job in the organisation, that of general manager.
From this discussion it is clear that the company may indeed be classified 
as an internal labour market. That point having been established, attention 
can be turned to the dynamics of this internal labour market to examine 
what types of practices were found concerning the allocation of and returns 
to manpower and what the implications of these were in the company.
The Dynamics of the Internal Labour Market
Several interrelated aspects of the internal labour market in this company 
are discussed in this section of the paper: the first aspect deals with job 
categories and the races of employees.
(i) The Racial Allocation of Jobs
The managerial, professional, technical and skilled positions in this com­
pany were filled almost entirely by Europeans, while the lowest employment 
category, containing semi-and un-skilled jobs, was filled entirely by blacks.
i4l use the term ‘European’ in the Rhodesian sense, i.e. to include whites, Asians and 
Coloureds. A distinction is explicitly made in the rest of this paper between whites, 
which term excludes Asians and Coloureds, and Europeans. The term black(s) and' 
African (s) are used interchangably.
tsThe exception is an African on the junior management grade and, in management’s 
view, holding management status. However, de facto, in terms of privileges, authority, 
income and various other criteria, this man does not rank even with white foremen, 
let alone management, although he is acknowledged by most employees —  black and 
white — to be the most senior black employee. Nevertheless, in this paper, he is not 
classified as management but as supervisory in accordance with his de facto situation.
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Only in the clerical and supervisory positions were both Africans and Euro­
peans found, but even here there was no single post where merit-based, inter­
racial competition occurred. It was management’s stated position that a multi­
racial employment category would not be permitted to arise in the 
company and that race was therefore an implicit criterion in recruitment for 
jobs in this category. Hence, with respect to the supervisory jobs, there was 
differentiation along racial lines in the following ways: whites in supervisory 
positions were called foremen while blacks were termed supervisors: (white) 
foremen and trainee foremen were at the bottom end of their mobility clusters 
while (black) supervisors were at the top of theirs, usually having taken 
up to fifteen years to reach such seniority; criteria for recruitment as trainee 
foremen were approximately the same as, or, in a significant number of cases, 
less than, those for supervisors; whites were never regarded as being in sub­
ordinate positions to blacks, even when the former were only trainees; income 
differentials existed between supervisors and foremen, favouring the latter, 
despite the fact that they were doing essentially the same jobs.
White employees in clerical jobs, mainly females employed as secretaries 
and receptionists, had only a few positions available to them, all approximately 
on the same job grade, and so had little or no depth to their mobility cluster: 
this lack of opportunity was in line with management’s stated discrimination 
against women in the internal labour market. Increasingly, it appeared, except 
for receptionists and secretaries, clerical jobs were becoming incorporated into 
the mobility clusters of the male, African-occupied part of the employment 
category.
In summary of this first aspect of the company’s internal labour 
market, it may be said that, as part of local management’s manpower poli­
cies, a clear colour bar existed, discriminating against African employees in 
respect of conditions of service and wages, the second aspect of this internal 
labour market which is discussed in the following section.
(ii) Returns to Manpower: Income Differentiation
Average annual per capita white and black incomes (excluding the all- 
white, highest-paid, managerial and professional positions) showed a signific­
ant gap in this company. The figures at the end of 1973 were approximately 
RM200 for semi-and un-skilled workers, all of whom were black, and 
approximately Rh$l 600 for the other two employment categories, of which 
between a quarter and a third were white females or blacks in roughly equal 
proportions.
There were two main aspects to income differentiation in this company: 
firstly, wage rates varied according to the type of job, the more senior and
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responsible jobs being rewarded with higher rates of pay. In such a situation, 
differentiation was in terms of the apparent worth to the company of the 
employee. However, with a relatively clear racial barrier to merit advancement 
in employment, indicated earlier, this form of wage differentiation was also 
a form of racial discrimination. To argue, as management in this and other 
companies did, that wage differentials were based only on job type and that 
there was no form of racial bias involved, was to ignore the institutional 
constraints which were imposed and largely controlled by management.
The second aspect of wage differentiation concerned bonuses and other 
income-related payments. In this company, specific tasks were allocated 
to certain employees and, once successfully completed, a cash reward or 
bonus, commensurate with management’s perceived value of the task to the 
company, was paid to the employee. Only whites were allocated such tasks, 
however, mainly the lower-paid whites, who, relative to Europeans in general, 
were ‘in need’ of such supplements to their incomes. Blacks, who by most 
standards and especially relative to whites, were in much greater need of 
increased incomes, were not considered for this bonus system.
Other bonus payments were related to weekly or fortnightly production 
targets. All employees in departments where production could be measured 
reasonably accurately were paid a basic wage (which generally did not alter) 
plus a 10 per cent bonus if the production target was met. The bonus was 
variable: for every percentage point that production was above or below 
target, the employees’ bonuses were altered by the same percentage in the 
same direction. However, management admitted to the following shortcomings 
of this system, most of which were also highlighted in discussions with em­
ployees:
i. not all products or processes had standard times set for them, so it was 
not possible to set production targets for all departments, all products, 
or all employees;
ii. such standard times as had been set were not made known to the em­
ployees, who were therefore not in a position to assess whether targets 
were realistic or over- or under-stated, nor to calculate what bonuses 
should be paid on the basis of production;
iii. production runs were often short in some departments and special requests 
from management and marketing often interrupted production so that 
standard times were rendered suspect;
iv. bonuses were used as negative sanctions, being deducted from employees’ 
incomes as punishment for various ‘offences’, such as lateness or disturb­
ances during off-duty hours in the company’s African village, which were 
often not even related to production;
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v. finally, and possibly most significantly, the actual cash amounts involved 
in this bonus system were quite insignificant and were perceived as such 
by the employees. This point is especially important given the generally 
low incomes earned. For instance, in 1973, minimum rates of pay for 
grade III jobs in the semi-and un-skilled category,16 laid down in the 
industrial regulations, were Rh$5,875 per week at starting; $6,425 per 
week after 6 months; and $8,000 per week after 12 months. Bonuses would 
therefore be 58,75 cents 64,25 cents, and 80 cents respectively per week. In 
order to double their bonuses and so increase their wages by approximately 
9 per cent per week, employees would have had to double weekly depart­
mental output.
(iii) Differentiation in Benefits and Conditions of Service
Similar to the situation just described pertaining to incomes, racial differ­
entiation in benefits and conditions of service was also found. For example, 
the industrial regulations pertaining to this company,17 which applied to 
virtually all Africans, laid down that workers were generally entitled to annual 
leave equal to one working day in each four weeks. As Saturday was defined 
as a working day, this amounted to continuous annual leave of only two weeks 
curation. Employees not covered by the regulations, however, were generally 
given three full weeks leave. Furthermore, because of the scarcity of skilled 
and technical manpower in the external labour market, employees in these 
latter types of jobs, all of whom were European, were also given three weeks 
leave even though some were covered by the industrial regulations. Therefore, 
because these latter employees were European, differentiation in respect of an­
nual leave was also along racial lines. Furthermore, if the company chose to 
shut down at a particular period during the year, then virtually all black em­
ployees were required to take their leave at that time while white employees 
were generally accommodated at their own convenience during the year. This 
accommodation was possible because few whites were integrally involved 
in the production processes.
A further indicator of racially differentiated conditions of service per­
tained to pensions. All white males had to belong to the contributory company 
pension scheme; none of the white females could join. Only approximately 45 
(out of approximately 2 100) black employees were members of this pension 
scheme. These blacks will receive lower pensions than their white colleagues
i6The Industrial regulations for this industry specify nine job grades in this category, 
grade d being the highest. I may note that over three-quarters of all employees in this 
category are in jobs below grade I II  and that employees in this category make up well 
over 80% of all employees in this company.
!7The reader will recall that these regulations are largely determined by management in 
this company.
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on termination of employment: firstly, because the scheme is contributory 
and black employees have been on lower salary scales thereby accruing lower 
pension benefits; and secondly, because blacks have only recently been allowed 
to join the scheme and so their accumulated benefits will be much lower in the 
immediate future than those who have been contributing for some time. All 
other African employees receive a gratuity on retirement, as laid down in the 
industrial regulations: the amounts involved are indicated below in table 1.
TABLE 1
RETIREMENT GRATUITIES FOR AFRICAN EMPLOYEES
Years of service 
minimum (10 years) 
15 
20 
25 
30
maximum (35 years)
Cash gratuity for highest 
income category (Rh$) 
53,33
116.67 
213,33
338.67
446.67 
600,00
The company was investigating the implementation of a pension scheme for 
all employees but this is not likely to materialise for some time yet.
Several other instances of benefits accruing differentially according to 
race could be discussed. However, rather than present a list that is tedious 
and largely repetitive, I presume that the examples given are sufficient to 
demonstrate the principle involved. In any event, at least one further instance 
of this type of differentiation — concerning overseas seminars — is discussed 
below in connection with manpower development.
(iv) The Allocation of Manpower: Training and Development
In describing and identifying the company as an internal labour market, 
I indicated that the use of race as a selection criterion gave rise to a colour 
bar in employment. As a result, only blacks were employed in the lowest 
employment category, only whites in the top two categories, and, while both 
races were employed in the clerical and supervisory positions, there were no 
posts for which there was open or even covert competition between the races. 
However, direct racial barriers were not the only means of preventing inter­
racial competition in employment: at least two other ways existed, through con­
ditions of service and remuneration (which have just been discussed); and 
through access to experience and training.
Turning now to the question of training, in the lower employment cate­
gories, on-job training was given to the semi-and un-skilled workers by other
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employees already operational. No attempt was made to monitor or assess the 
adequacy of this unstructured, informal training and management was thus 
able to claim that these employees did not have the necessary training for 
promotion to more senior jobs, especially in a higher employment category.'8 
Similarly those employees trained as machinists in the company’s training 
school where simulation was used, were considered to be well-trained for semi­
skilled machining jobs only. In contrast to this situation, whites in the top 
two employment categories, who were not already specialised in particular 
fields, were given access to sponsored, in-company training which led to an 
internationally-recognised professional qualification, thus making such em­
ployees ‘suitable’ for top management and professional jobs.
In between these situations lay the supervisors and foremen. Employees 
in these job grades did essentially the same work, attended the same 
in-company supervision course — on which, at any given educational 
level, the Africans tended to perform significantly better than their white 
colleagues19 — and yet were not regarded as equals in employment; super­
visors, i.e. Africans, received lower pay, were regarded as subordinate to 
foremen, and did not have access to the same benefits, such as special tasks 
and attendance at overseas seminars. Management made it quite clear to me 
that, although the basic prerequisites for a merit-based employment situation 
existed, under no circumstances would they permit interracial competition. It 
was company policy, in the face of a tight external labour market for (white) 
foremen and trainee foremen, to introduce another grade of employment for 
Africans between the posts of supervisor and foreman, which would never­
theless still be subordinate to that of foreman. Similarly, in the workshop 
mobility cluster of the skilled and technical category, the company had ex­
perienced some difficulty in attracting apprentices and artisans, who had to 
be Europeans. Instead of apprenticing blacks, and so generating internally the 
solution to their employment problem, management argued that existing 
skilled employees would not permit the apprenticing of Africans: in other 
words, according to management, custom dictated that Africans could not be 
employed in certain types of jobs, although management was not able to sub­
stantiate this belief.20 In this company, then training which would qualify em­
ployees for promotion to the top two employment categories was not available 
to semi- and un-skilled African employees. Where such training was made
isThis claim by management was partially contradicted by another statement in which 
management said that black employees, especially certain supervisors, were good enough 
for promotion to foremen (and later possibly to management). The reason, according 
to management, why such promotion was not attempted was white employee resistance, 
a contention that was not substantiated. For a fuller discussion of this aspect, cf. 
Murphree et al op cit. 169-76.
I9cf. Murphree et al op cit. table 14:3, p.266.
2°cf. Murphree et at op cit. 269-76.
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available to blacks, as in the case of supervisors, a racial barrier to promotion 
was erected by management. In the case of entrance to skilled employment, 
where management admitted it had an employment problem, management 
argued that custom, i.e. white employees resistance to changes in the racial 
status quo, prevented the company from making fuller use of black potential.
The situation pertaining to training parallelled that concerning experience: 
employees in the semi- and un-skilled employment category were not con­
sidered to be experienced for any other category of employment, a not un­
realistic assessment on the face of it. However, in the next employment cate­
gory, clerical and supervisory, where blacks and whites did very similar jobs, 
it would not be unreasonable to expect that senior African employees would 
be suitably experienced for consideration for promotion, or at least further 
training in preparation for promotion, to a more senior and responsible em­
ployment category in the company. But, as has been indicated, management 
had erected a racial barrier to such advancement and, by classifying the posts 
of supervisor and foreman as different jobs, could claim that the experience 
supervisors obtained was not the same as that obtained by foremen, nor 
sufficient to warrant consideration for promotion. Seen especially against the 
background of their statement that as part of company policy, African super­
visors would not be promoted further, this claim concerning experience ap­
pears simply to be a rationalisation for the colour bar facing supervisors.
The situation pertaining to training and experience was epitomised in the 
circumstances surrounding attendance at overseas seminars or meetings. The 
group of which the local company is part holds a series of international 
seminars, organised by head office, on specialised aspects of the organisation’s 
operations. Attendance at these seminars by employees was at the company’s 
expense and was considered to be a fringe benefit as well as a potentially im­
portant addition to training background, since the latest advances in the 
organisation’s operations are discussed and international contacts among staff 
are made at these meetings. However, only when they had reached a certain 
level of employment were employees considered for nomination to these 
meetings. In the past, African employees have attended these seminars and 
have travelled in multiracial parties on an equal basis with their white col­
leagues. By 1973, however, blacks were no longer nominated: when asked 
why, management claimed that nominations were made by head office in 
Canada and that local management had no say in the matter. This explanation 
was not entirely accurate, however, because annual performance assessments 
for local employees were made by local management and submitted to head 
office. In these assessments, management made recommendations on the 
suitability of the employee for attendance at international seminars as well 
as for horizontal and vertical mobility within the group. If, therefore, local 
management recommended an employee, it was likely — though not certain
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— that the employee would be nominated. Moreover, these annual assessments 
were made only for certain categories of employees and local management 
did not, at the time of research, classify any Africans among those suitable for 
promotion or international transfer. Hence, in practice, local management 
either did not assess Africans such that head office might consider them for 
transfer, promotion, or attendance at international meetings; or local manage­
ment did not recommend that black employees be nominated for such ad­
vancement or benefit. These practices by local management were supported 
by other, racially discriminatory practices, in a self-reinforcing system which 
tended to perpetuate discrimination against blacks in the internal labour 
market.
(v) Implications of Skill Specificity
The dynamics of internal labour markets centre largely around three 
factors: specific skills, on-job training, and custom, the latter two already 
having been discussed. In the company under consideration, there was a 
relatively high degree of skill specificity in two factories, firstly, because 
these were manufacturing plants and there was a great deal of individual 
contribution to production, and secondly because this company was far the 
largest of a very small number of firms in this field. Employees in these 
plants thus obtained skills that were not widely transferable, even within the 
company complex in Rhodesia. However, because the acquisition of these 
skills was not generally formalised, structured or monitored at the lower em­
ployment levels, little or no overt recognition was accorded to these em­
ployees’ abilities. These skills were sufficiently specific, even at this level of 
employment, not to be readily usable in other industries, thus preventing em­
ployees from capitalising on their skill resources and changing companies. 
This situation meant that semi- and un-skilled black employees had little 
chance of inter-company mobility based on their skills, nor were their skills 
sufficient to place them in a strong bargaining position vis-a-vis management 
in matters affecting their employment in this company.
In higher employment categories, the same type of skill specificity, at a 
higher level, also tended to bind white employees to the company. At the lower 
levels of white employment, however, white employees controlled a valua­
ble, scarce resources in their specific skills and were thus in a strong position 
relative to management in defending and advancing their employment situa­
tions. In any event, employees in these categories were generally in or close 
to decision-making positions, while decision-makers had frequently been pro­
moted from posts in these two categories. As a result, not only was manage­
ment prepared to accept the viewpoint of these employees in such matters as 
colour bars and wage and welfare differentials, but probably also had a 
good deal of personal sympathy for these employees’ stance. Furthermore,
130 THE RHODESIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
being bound by their skill specificity to the company was not particularly 
disadvantageous for the white employees, since their employment opportuni­
ties were limited only by their own abilities, and their benefits and conditions 
of services were generally good.
In these top two employement categories, then, the skills issue was rela­
tively clear-cut. Why, then, should management adopt a racially discriminatory 
stance regarding the clerical and supervisory grades? There are three possible 
answers to this question: economic rationality; a demonstration effect aimed 
at showing whites in the top categories that there was no ‘creeping black 
threat’ to their employment; and conformity to social norms, as these were 
interpreted by management. Unfortunately, not being allowed access to pro­
duction data, I was unable to obtain sufficient data to indicate conclusively 
which one or which combination of these three possible reasons actually 
applied in this company. However, the question of economic rationality is 
discussed further in the next section.
Economic Rationality and the Racial Allocation of Jobs
With a surplus in the external labour market of unskilled — but not 
uneducated — job seekers, who are generally obliged to accept semi- and 
un-skilled employment, it may have been economically rational for manage­
ment to maintain the racial status quo.2' However, in none- o f the four 
factories, or anywhere else in the organisation for that matter, had 
management attempted to demonstrate such possible rationality. In fact, the 
necessary prerequisite of such rationality — the setting of specific goals such 
as minimising direct labour costs — had not been explicitly formulated; nor 
was the company operating with any explicit time horizon. Furthermore, 
management had not considered several other important points. For example, 
if racial differentiation was synonymous with exploitation in respect of wages 
and conditions of service, then economic rationality underlying the pricing 
of black labour might be illusory, for under these circumstances, employees 
are likely to work in a manner they consider to be appropriate to their 
remuneration, and not to the best of their abilities. It is also clear that, 
under such circumstances, there may be a gross waste of the country’s human 
resources. In the company under discussion, for example, the educational 
criteria for recruiting lower category African employees varied between a full 
primary education and lower secondary schooling. Although many black em­
ployees had higher educational qualifications, they offered only those certifi­
cates required in order to obtain employment. In a number of cases, such em­
ployees were better qualified than white employees who were their seniors, but
2'Economic rationality requires: i) the setting of an objective —  for example, maximise 
profits, minimise costs, maximise market share, optimise capital and material usage, or 
any one or a combination of an infinite number of goals; and ii) the choice of a time 
horizon. In other words, objectives are attained over a given period.
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the Africans were nevertheless confined to low-level jobs in which they grossly 
underutilised. Such a situation was wasteful of resources not only at the 
company level, but also at the national level, through the lack of articulation 
between public investment in education and private utilisation (or lack of it) 
of such investment.
The racial basis of discrimination in this company also has implications 
for the wider society. For example, there has been much discussion about the 
emergence of an African ‘middle class’ in Rhodesia.22 Such emergence, of 
course, is at least partly dependent on ‘middle class’ employment opportunities 
being made available to Africans. This case study has indicated that in this 
company such opportunities were not made available to blacks and there were 
no immediate signs of such opportunities becoming available. Until the situa­
tion alters, then, from being based on race to being based on ‘industrial 
class’,23 the emergence of an African ‘middle class’ is likely to be hindered, 
and, consequently, the development of African purchasing power and markets 
will be retarded. In the longer term, such retardation may prove not to have 
been an economically rational strategy for management after all.24
In the foregoing discussion on the dynamics of this internal labour market, 
I have made frequent reference to the role of management in perpetuating 
the status quo. At the beginning of this paper, I  indicated that my major theme 
would be the responsibility of management to workers. In the final part of 
this paper, therefore, I consider the position of management, concentrating on 
the ways in which responsibilities to employees in this company have been 
met.
Management Responsibilities in the Internal Labour Market
Implicit in this company’s manifesto were ‘equal’ and ‘fair’ employment 
opportunities and access to those facilities providing such opportunities for 
all employees; ‘fair’ conditions of service; ‘just’ rewards for ‘satisfactory’ 
service; and other indirect benefits through responsibilities to the host com­
munity within which the company operates, which includes, of course, its 
own employees. Without any doubt, these objectives were met with respect to 
white employees in the organisation, although one possible criticism may be 
made: by recruiting employees from overseas in certain cases, jobs were denied
22For some of the recent discussion on stratification in Rhodesia, cf. Weinrich A. K. H.
Black and White Elites in Rural Rhodesia, Heinneman, London, 1973.
^Although the situation is possibly moving towards a class system, race obviously remains 
a very important factor, as shown in this paper.
2«An obvious point here is that management in any one company cannot be expected 
alone to develop an African ‘middle class’, or African purchasing power and markets. 
The problem is one of getting all interested parties together to achieve what is com­
monly desired.
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to local residents. However, viewed in the group context, by allowing inter­
national transfers, the companies within the group look after their own 
staff on a group-wide basis and also thereby maintain the high standards of 
production required. Nevertheless, transfers of junior employees might still be 
difficult to justify, especially in terms of maintaining performance standards 
in the recipient country, in this case Rhodesia, if there are many, adequately- 
qualified, potential employees in the external labour market of that country.
With respect to black employees, management also met its claimed res­
ponsibilities in a number of ways, including the provision of housing, a club, 
and some training facilities. But, when compared, firstly, to the facilities pro­
vided for a much smaller number of white employees, and secondly, to the 
total number of Africans in the company, these facilities appeared to be both 
qualitatively and quantitatively inadequate and were certainly viewed in this 
light by the black employees themselves. In certain other respects, most 
notably the provision of a new sports stadium and beerhall,25 these employees 
acknowledged that the company had met a community need. Even so, such 
facilities were regarded by blacks as secondary to the main needs of black 
workers, especially in low-level employment, the needs of income, job security 
and opportunity.
By not acknowledging the adequacy and relevance of the training re­
ceived by employees in the lower employment categories; by denying these 
workers access to formal, structured training facilities offering access to higher 
employment categories; by erecting racial barriers to advancement, allegedly 
at the insistence of white employees; by claiming, invalidity, that head office 
was responsible for promotion and nomination to international seminars; by 
all these actions, local management in this company indicated that it was 
not prepared to advance Africans in the internal labour market beyond 
those positions already attained. This situation, of course, conflcted with the 
intent of the company manifesto on responsibility towards employees.
It is quite clear, therefore, that local management in this company ap­
plied dual standards in its modes of meeting its responsibilities: white em­
ployees were treated in a manner that management considered ‘appropriate’ 
to Europeans, while blacks were treated differently. The present public debate 
on company responsibilities to employees must therefore be viewed with some 
degree of scepticism, in the light of this case study, with regard to the im­
plementation of improvements.
zsBy law in Rhodesia, all beer hall profits must be ploughed back into welfare facilities, 
including housing, for the African community. By providing a beer hall, therefore, 
management can effectively increase the contributions of workers to their own welfare, 
for a given level of welfare costs, thus reducing the call on company resources. 
In this light, the provision appears to the company more as an investment than a con­
tribution to social welfare facilities for employees.
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